# Description of Changes
Fixes share-link navigation for SSO users. Reported on v2.9.2 with
`SSOAutoLogin: true`: clicking a `/share/<token>` link in an email
redirected the user to the home page after SSO instead of the shared
file.
## Root cause
Three compounding issues had to be fixed together; the first was the
initial symptom but the other two only surfaced during live
verification.
1. **Spring Security blocked `/share/<token>` for unauthenticated
users.** The route wasn't in `RequestUriUtils.isPublicAuthEndpoint`, so
the server 302'd straight to `/login` before React could load
`ShareLinkPage`. The share URL was lost because `NullRequestCache` is
configured and never persisted the original destination.
2. **`httpErrorHandler` full-page-redirected to `/login?from=<path>` on
any unhandled 401** (fired by `LicenseContext`, `AppConfig`, etc. during
normal ShareLinkPage mount). That *did* preserve the return path — but
**Spring Security strips query strings from `/login`** (302 to bare
`/login`), so `?from=` never reached React. Confirmed via `curl -i
http://localhost:8080/login?from=xyz` → `Location: /login`.
3. **`AuthCallback.tsx` unconditionally `navigate("/")`** after the
SAML/OAuth round-trip, discarding any intended destination.
## Fix
**Backend** — make `/share/<token>` a public SPA bootstrap, data APIs
stay protected:
- `RequestUriUtils.isPublicAuthEndpoint` — permits `^/share/[^/]+/?$`
(tight regex, single token segment only; `/share/<token>/anything` stays
protected).
- `ReactRoutingController` — dedicated `@GetMapping("/share/{token}")`
mirroring `/auth/callback`.
- `/api/v1/storage/share-links/**` remains behind Spring Security with
its existing `canAccessShareLink` check.
**Frontend** — persist the return path across full-page redirects via
`sessionStorage` (same-origin, survives the SSO round-trip):
- `httpErrorHandler.ts` — stashes current pathname to
`stirling_post_login_path` before the 401 → `/login` redirect.
- `springAuthClient.ts` — new `isSafePostLoginRedirect` /
`setPostLoginRedirectPath` / `consumePostLoginRedirectPath` helpers
(rejects protocol-relative URLs and auth-plumbing paths to guard against
open-redirect abuse).
- `Login.tsx` — on explicit user sign-in, read path from
`location.state` or `?from=` query and stash it; don't clobber an
already-stashed value.
- `AuthCallback.tsx` — consume the stashed path (single-use) and
`navigate(target)` instead of always `/`.
---
## Checklist
### General
- [ ] I have read the [Contribution
Guidelines](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [ ] I have read the [Stirling-PDF Developer
Guide](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/DeveloperGuide.md)
(if applicable)
- [ ] I have read the [How to add new languages to
Stirling-PDF](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/devGuide/HowToAddNewLanguage.md)
(if applicable)
- [ ] I have performed a self-review of my own code
- [ ] My changes generate no new warnings
### Documentation
- [ ] I have updated relevant docs on [Stirling-PDF's doc
repo](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-Tools.github.io/blob/main/docs/)
(if functionality has heavily changed)
- [ ] I have read the section [Add New Translation
Tags](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/devGuide/HowToAddNewLanguage.md#add-new-translation-tags)
(for new translation tags only)
### Translations (if applicable)
- [ ] I ran
[`scripts/counter_translation.py`](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/docs/counter_translation.md)
### UI Changes (if applicable)
- [ ] Screenshots or videos demonstrating the UI changes are attached
(e.g., as comments or direct attachments in the PR)
### Testing (if applicable)
- [ ] I have run `task check` to verify linters, typechecks, and tests
pass
- [ ] I have tested my changes locally. Refer to the [Testing
Guide](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/DeveloperGuide.md#7-testing)
for more details.
---------
Co-authored-by: EthanHealy01 <[email protected]>
# Description of Changes
Redesign AI engine so that it autogenerates the `tool_models.py` file
from the OpenAPI spec so the Python has access to the Java API
parameters and the full list of Java tools that it can run. CI ensures
that whenever someone modifies a tool endpoint that the AI enigne tool
models get updated as well (the dev gets told to run `task
engine:tool-models`).
There's loads of advantages to having the Java be the one that actually
executes the tools, rather than the frontend as it was previously set up
to theoretically use:
- The AI gets much better descriptions of the params from the API docs
- It'll be usable headless in the future so a Java daemon could run to
execute ops on files in a folder without the need for the UI to run
- The Java already has all the logic it needs to execute the tools
- We don't need to parse the TypeScript to find the API (which is hard
because the TS wasn't designed to be computer-read to extract the API)
I've also hooked up the prototype frontend to ensure it's working
properly, and have built it in a way that all the tool names can be
translated properly, which was always an issue with previous prototypes
of this.
---------
Co-authored-by: Anthony Stirling <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: EthanHealy01 <[email protected]>
# Description of Changes
Adds a streaming endpoint to the Java AI orchestrator
(`/api/v1/ai/orchestrate/stream` in addition to the existing
`/api/v1/ai/orchestrate`). This allows the caller to get updates of what
stage of orchestration is being run at the time so UIs can give the user
feedback.
Also contains some dubious Gradle changes to suppress errors coming from
Spotless, when it crashes in Google stuff. I'm not sure if that's
appropriate to add, feel free to ask for changes in review.
# Description of Changes
Add Java orchestration layer which can connect and go back and forth
with the AI engine to get results for the user. It's expected that the
AI engine will not be publicly available and this Java layer will always
be in front of it, to manage sessions and auth etc.
## PR: Certificate Pre-Validation for Document Signing
### Problem
When a participant uploaded a certificate to sign a document, there was
no validation at submission time. If the certificate had the wrong
password, was expired, or was incompatible with the signing algorithm,
the error only surfaced during **finalization** — potentially days
later, after all other participants had signed. At that point the
session is stuck with no way to recover.
Additionally, `buildKeystore` in the finalization service only
recognised `"P12"` as a cert type, causing a `400 Invalid certificate
type: PKCS12` error when the **owner** signed using the standard
`PKCS12` identifier.
---
### What this PR does
#### Backend — Certificate pre-validation service
Adds `CertificateSubmissionValidator`, which validates a keystore before
it is stored by:
1. Loading the keystore with the provided password (catches wrong
password / corrupt file)
2. Checking the certificate's validity dates (catches expired and
not-yet-valid certs)
3. Test-signing a blank PDF using the same `PdfSigningService` code path
as finalization (catches algorithm incompatibilities)
This runs on both the participant submission endpoint
(`WorkflowParticipantController`) and the owner signing endpoint
(`SigningSessionController`), so both flows are protected.
#### Backend — Bug fix
`SigningFinalizationService.buildKeystore` now accepts `"PKCS12"` and
`"PFX"` as aliases for `"P12"`, consistent with how the validator
already handles them. This fixes a `400` error when the owner signed
using the `PKCS12` cert type.
#### Frontend — Real-time validation feedback
`ParticipantView` gains a debounced validation call (600ms) triggered
whenever the cert file or password changes. The UI shows:
- A spinner while validating
- Green "Certificate valid until [date] · [subject name]" on success
- Red error message on failure (wrong password, expired, not yet valid)
- The submit button is disabled while validation is in flight
#### Tests — Three layers
| Layer | File | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| Service unit | `CertificateSubmissionValidatorTest` | 11 tests — valid
P12/JKS, wrong password, corrupt bytes, expired, not-yet-valid, signing
failure, cert type aliases |
| Controller unit | `WorkflowParticipantValidateCertificateTest` | 4
tests — valid cert, invalid cert, missing file, invalid token |
| Controller integration | `CertificateValidationIntegrationTest` | 6
tests — real `.p12`/`.jks` files through the full controller → validator
stack |
| Frontend E2E | `CertificateValidationE2E.spec.ts` | 7 Playwright tests
— all feedback states, button behaviour, SERVER type bypass |
#### CI
- **PR**: Playwright runs on chromium when frontend files change (~2-3
min)
- **Nightly / on-demand**: All three browsers (chromium, firefox,
webkit) at 2 AM UTC, also manually triggerable via `workflow_dispatch`
# Description of Changes
Change the SAML support for SSO to understand when a request is coming
from the desktop app, and use the alternate auth flow that the desktop
app requires.
LudyandGitHub
ConnorYohandGitHub
